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Trading Behavior in a 
Marginal Organized Market 
Hikaru Hanawa Peterson 
As increasingly more transactions occur away from open markets, the so-called "thin" 
market issues arise. This paper analyzes unpublished transaction data from Egg 
Clearinghouse, Inc. (ECI), a marginal marketplace for eggs that  trades 4% of all eggs 
(80%  of eggs available for open trading). Results suggest that  marginalized markets 
can serve as  an  inventory adjustment mechanism while maintaining the role of price 
discovery as a check for non-market prices. At ECI, most firms both buy and sell 
regardless of operational types, participation is balanced across all types of firms in 
the industry, and sellers in general yield to buyers' preferred terms of trade. 
Key  words: eggs, inventory adjustment, organized  market, price  discovery, thin 
market 
Introduction 
Many U.S.  agricultural commodity sectors rely on market transactions to discover 
prices. Yet, an increasing number of transactions take place away from open markets 
through alternative pricing mechanisms such as private negotiations and formula 
pricing. In 2001,36% of commodities were produced under contract, compared to 12% 
in 1969 (MacDonald et al., 2004). For some commodities, such as  poultry and eggs, less 
than 10% of total volume is available for transactions in open markets. These open and 
organized markets are becoming increasingly marginalized  in the sense that they 
handle a smaller fraction of total volume. Some would refer to these markets as "thin" 
markets (Mueller et al., 1996; Raikes, 1978; Dunn, 1978).l 
The thinness of a market does not necessarily imply poor market performance, but 
prices determined in thin markets raise concerns (Tomek and Robinson, 1990;  Hayenga 
et al., 1978). First, transacted and reported prices may no longer represent overall 
supply and demand conditions. Second, thinness may cause excess volatility in the 
market price, increasing transaction costs for market participants due to higher price 
risk. Finally, potential impacts  of individual  transactions on price in thin markets create 
incentives for price manipulation. Unless such opportunities to influence market prices 
are merely a perception or exist for very brief periods, market efficiency will be com- 
promised. 
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These concerns were first addressed in the late 1970s (see Hayenga, 1978). Past 
research on thin markets is sparse, and has focused either on price precision (Tomek, 
1980; Nelson and Turner, 1995; Ward and Choi, 1998) or liquidity in futures trading 
(e.g., Thompson and Waller, 1988).2  Mueller et al. (1996) conducted a unique study on 
the National Cheese Exchange and found evidence of price manipulation by three major 
cheese manufacturers from 1988 to 1993. Recently, several studies have addressed 
developments in the livestock sector caused by increased thinness in open markets (e.g., 
Schroeter and Azzam, 2004; Zhang and Sexton, 2000). Since the proportion of open mar- 
ket transactions relative to total market volume is expected to decline with the further 
industrialization of  agriculture, trading behavior  in a marginal organized  market 
warrants examination. This paper contributes to the  literature by analyzing  transaction 
data from a marginal open marketplace to document trading behavior and to explore 
alternative roles for open and organized markets as they become marginalized. 
The data consist of  unpublished transaction records from Egg Clearinghouse, Inc. 
(ECI), an organized national farm-level marketplace for eggs. In the U.S. egg industry, 
approximately 95% of  eggs have been marketed through contracts during the recent 
decade, where the price is based on wholesale quotes published online daily in Urner 
Barry's (UB's) Price-Current. The remaining 5% are available for trading through an 
open market (Clapper, 1999), of which about 80% are traded at  ECI. This proportion of 
trading volume relative to quantity available for open trading suggests that ECI has 
been functioning well. For example, another marginal marketplace, the spot cheese 
market at  the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),  trades less than 1%  of U.S. cheese, 
where about 20% of cheese is available for open trading (Ledman,  2005). Thus, a natural 
question is: What has contributed to ECI's success? 
A critical difference between the two marketplaces is that the cheese exchange price 
is used to price all U.S. cheese, while ECI's role in price discovery is secondary because 
most eggs are priced relative to UB quotes. The primary role of ECI appears to be an 
inventory adjustment mechanism for egg industry constituents. Another notable differ- 
ence between the marketplaces is that only two cheese products are traded at  the CME 
in specific units (1,000 40-pound blocks or 44-pound barrels for delivery within 300 
miles of  Green Bay, WI), whereas at ECI, numerous egg products are traded for any 
quantity to be delivered to trader-specified locations. 
Preliminary examination of the  transaction data used in this study reveals that most 
ECI members both buy and sell eggs, allowing for the possibility of price manipulation. 
Specifically, firms intending to sell (buy) may initially purchase (sell) some eggs to 
lessen (increase) market supply and raise (lower) the price, while they negotiate other 
transactions off the open market. In fact, Mueller et al. (1996) found evidence of  price 
manipulation during the period  when firms bought  and sold concurrently at the 
National Cheese Exchange. However, these seemingly converse transactions, where the 
good is purchased by its producers and sold by its users, are consistent with ECI being 
used  as a  means of  inventory adjustment, prompted  by  changes in supply  chain 
coordination. With increased private negotiations, sellers commit themselves to deliver 
'Literature on thin markets can be found in  many areas of study besides agricultural economics: finance (e.g., Kyle, 1985), 
financial econometrics (e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997),  game theory (e.g., Selten and Wooders, 1991), studies of 
water or land markets (e.g., Saleth,  Braden, and Eheart, 1991),  and in  macroeconomics (e.g., Howitt and McAfee, 1992)  among 
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quantities demanded by their clients. When their inventory is short of commitment, they 
would rely on spot trading to procure the difference. 
The literature on successful trading, which has focused on futures contracts and 
exchanges (e.g., Carlton, 1984), suggests that a successful marketplace needs to offer 
trading  terms  which are  evenly balanced between buyers and sellers (Leuthold, Junkus, 
and Cordier, 1989, p. 20). Thus, one possible explanation for ECI's success is that it  has 
attracted balanced levels of participation from various egg industry groups. The first objec- 
tive of this paper is to examine the degree of ECI participation by firm characteristics. 
While the role of price discovery may be secondary, prices discovered at  ECI should 
serve as a check for assessing how UB quotes reflect market  condition^.^ A term of trade 
at  ECI allows for trades to be consummated for spot or future delivery, and eggs can be 
quoted in terms of  the spot price or priced off of the UB quote at the time of delivery. 
The latter term is referred to as being "market-adjusted," and it does not contribute to 
price discovery. The ECI prices may not represent the market situation accurately if 
certain firms favored one term over another. Accordingly, the second objective of the 
paper is to identify characteristics of the transaction and firms involved that determine 
the selected pricing terms. The analysis may shed light on the price discovery role of 
ECI and the relative bargaining power between egg producers and users. 
The remainder of this paper commences with overviews of egg trading and of trading 
statistics at  ECI. Next, marginal market trading is conceptualized as an  inventory man- 
agement problem, and ECI trading data are analyzed using tobit and logit regression. 
The paper concludes with implications for agricultural sectors with thinning open 
markets. 
Egg Trading 
Ninety-five percent of eggs produced in the  United States are exchanged based on long- 
term contracts (Clapper, 1999). A typical contract specifies pricing in terms of  the 
difference from the UB quotes, which are wholesale-level prices that include farm-level 
egg prices plus the costs of processing, cartoning, and transportation, based on public 
and private sources of information (Clapper, 2001). The UB quotes are released daily 
for four egg types and two egg products bought in six regions. In a standard egg con- 
tract, Sunday through Saturday deliveries are  priced off of the  preceding Thursday's UB 
quotes. In addition to the egg types and packaging desired by the buyer, some contracts 
specify the shelf life of the eggs. This is possible because with proper handling, eggs can 
remain fresh for four to five weeks at an appropriate temperature and humidity. The 
quantity is determined by daily orders made by the buyer. 
ECI was formed in 1971 based on the recommendation of a study commissioned by 
the  U.S. Congress troubled by egg pricing difficulties. The purpose ofECI was to develop 
quality and grade standards for eggs and to implement trading that would discover a 
fair price of eggs.4  As an  initial step toward this goal, ECI categorized eggs into table 
eggs and eggs sold to egg product manufacturem5  Then, a blind trading system was 
Maynard (1997)  found a feedback relationship between the UB quotes and ECI prices during 1994-95. 
The concern remains today due to the lack of transparency in the formula used for UB quotes. 
"table  eggs are required to meet the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  egg grade standards, which-in  descend- 
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implemented where the identity of both buyers and sellers is unknown to each other 
until the  trade has been consummated. Trading privileges are  granted to ECI members 
who pay monthly dues. 
The trading volume at ECI stagnated through the early 1980s. In 1984, ECI was 
placed under new management, and over the subsequent decade trading volume 
increased approximately four-fold. In 2001,203 million cases (1  case = 30 dozen) of shell 
eggs were produced in the  United States,  and ECI traded 8.7 million cases, representing 
4.3% of total shelled eggs produced and about 80%  of eggs that were not marketed under 
contract. In 2001, there were approximately 750 U.S. egg producers, with 60 companies 
producing 95% of  eggs (American Egg Board). At the end of  2001, ECI membership 
consisted of 169 egg producers, including 51  out of  64 firms listed by Egg Industry trade 
magazine as the top egg producers (Watt Publishing Co.). 
ECI's U.S. trading regions are the Northeast, Northwest, Midwest, South Central, 
Southeast, and Southwest. A few ECI members are Canadian firms. In 2001, the Mid- 
west and the Northeast accounted for more than half of members, while about 42% of 
members were situated in the three southern regions. The Midwest region accounted 
for 66% of regional selling, followed by the Northeast (18.5%)-three  midwestern states 
(Iowa, Indiana, and Ohio) in combination with Pennsylvania accounted for 34% of U.S. 
production in 2001 (USDNAgricultural Statistics Board, 2004). Regional buying was 
more evenly distributed, with the Southwest and the Midwest responsible for 30.6% and 
24.2%, respectively. 
Five types of eggs are traded at  ECI: (a)  gradeable nest run (GNR),  (b)  cartoned 
(CTN), (c)  graded loose (GL), (d)  nest run breaking stocks (NRBS), and (el checks 
(CHEX).  GNR eggs are  unwashed, unoiled, unsized, and ungraded table eggs. CTN and 
GL eggs are the most commonly traded table eggs at ECI.6 NRBS do not meet the 
quality standards of  table eggs, and eggs traded as checks (CHEX) are mainly with 
broken or cracked shells and intact membranes. All five egg types are sold in different 
weight or size classes (e.g., jumbo, extra large, large, medium, and small for CTN and 
GL eggs), and table eggs are further delineated by color (white and brown). In addition, 
two egg products are  traded at  ECI: liquid egg products (LIQ)  in tanker-loads and frozen 
egg products (FRZN) in 30-pound pails or cans. 
Accordingly, eggs traded on ECI are identified by region, type, weight or size class, 
and color. Given the detailed classification, the number of trades that occur per variety 
of eggs in a given period is limited. Even for the most commonly traded CTN whitellarge 
eggs, only one load was purchased in the Southeast during the entire year of  2001. 
Moreover, even in the most actively traded Southwest region, where 629 total loads 
were purchased, trading occurred on only 88  days. Hence, a spot, farm-level price series 
for a single variety of eggs does not exist, which is consistent with the ECI's role in price 
discovery being se~ondary.~ 
Most bids and offers on ECI are phoned to one of four trade coordinators; alterna- 
tively, they can be submitted online. The posted bids and offers include: bid or ask price, 
egg type (including weighttsize and color),  quantity, region (destination for bids, origin 
In 2001, GL white eggs accounted for over 36%  of total traded eggs, followed by CTN white eggs @I%),  GNR white eggs 
(13.3%),  and NRBS (12.8%).  Buyers with packing facilities tend to prefer CTN eggs over GNR eggs that require grading and 
cartoning,  and trading of CTN eggs has increased during recent years. Similarly, there has been an increase in the number 
of GL eggs sold for repackaging purposes at fully integrated in-line layer complexes (Clapper, 2002). 
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for offers), date of delivery, packaging format, weight per unit, and additional comment 
regarding the load. Bid and ask  prices can be posted in spot terms or in  market-adjusted 
terms that specify differences relative to the UB quote on the delivery date. Delivery 
schedules are specified in the ECI trading rule.'  The ECI trade coordinators mediate 
transactions by proposing changes to the posted terms to firms with similar bids and 
offers until an agreement is reached. The firms' identities are revealed to each other 
only after the trade is consummated. 
Trading Statistics at ECI 
ECI members consist of various egg operations, including small producers with no 
packing facilities, producers with packing facilities, egg breakers, manufacturers of egg 
products, distributors of eggs and egg products, and brokers. Each member was classi- 
fied into one or a combination of the  following three types (Clapper, 2001): (a)  those with 
layers ("producers"), (b)  those with processing or breaking facilities ("users"), and 
(c)  those distributing eggs ("brokers"). Of the 154  firms that traded on ECI at  least once 
during 2001, 84 were producers, 13  were users, 28 were brokers, and 23 owned both 
layers and a user facility ("prod-user"). Five firms conducted brokerage and also owned 
layers and/or a user facility. In total, 111 firms owned layers. 
Information on the size of the operation is available for egg production but not for 
user or brokerage activities. The trade magazine Egg Industry publishes results from 
its annual survey of leading egg producers, which include self-reported numbers of 
layers on December 31 (Watt Publishing Co.). Since information is self-reported and 
may have changed dramatically during the  year, averages of the self-reported number 
of layers in the Egg Industry's 1999,2000, and 2001 surveys were computed for each 
member and grouped to maintain anonymity of  firms: 1-2  million, 2-5  million, 5-10 
million, and more than 10 million layers. The firms with layers that were not listed in 
the survey results were assumed to have fewer than 1  million layers. 
Table 1  summarizes trade activity in 2001 for selected operational types and flock 
sizes. Frequency and quantities of purchases and sales clearly differed across opera- 
tional type. The average producer bought half as frequently (27 buys versus 54 sells) 
and also bought about half as  many eggs as it sold (21,693 cases bought versus 48,141 
cases sold). Users and brokers bought on average about 74 to 92 times during the year, 
while they sold  12 to 20 times. Integrated "prod-user" operations bought  and sold 
approximately 150,000 cases each. The average transaction sizes were, in  general, 
smaller for producers than for the  other operational types. For users, the average quan- 
tity sold was more than 10  times larger than  the average quantity  bought, because sales 
of egg products brought up the a~erage.~ 
The purchase-sales pattern  varied across flock size as  well. For firms with more than 
1  million layers, the  numbers of buys and sells were positively correlated with flock size. 
Firms with less than 1  million layers bought and sold more frequently than some of 
their larger  counterparts, likely  because  various vertical  arrangements were  not 
accounted for in the classification. The average transaction size was relatively similar 
across flock size. 
A regular delivery arrives three days after the date of trade. Loads can also be specified for delivery one to eight weeks 
from the date of trade, or for accelerated delivery. 
For example, a tanker-load of liquid egg product is equivalent to 48,000 cases. Table 1. Mean Levels of Trading by Selected Operational Type and Flock Size at ECI, 2001  2 
Operational Type "  Number of  Layers  s  y 
> 10  5-10  2-5  1-2  < 1  tv  0 
Description  Producer  User  Broker  Prod-User  Million  Million  Million  Million  Million  8 
Number of ECI Membersc  84  13  28  24  5  7  18  14  67 
Buys versus Sells: 
Number of buys  27  92  74  115  121  125  68  17  32 
Number of sells  54  12  20  135  249  231  63  21  53 
Quantity  bought  21,693  47,466  94,686  144,186  137,751  148,813  56,341  21,329  33,790 
Quantity  sold  48,141  28,160  21,719  151,930  277,633  236,700  70,601  17,713  47,198 
Average quantity  bought 
in a transaction  824.6  663.2  1,809.1  1,809.0  1,891.4  902.0  814.2  1,813.9  948.4 
Average quantity  sold in a 
transaction  795.7  8,598.7  1,927.7  1,111.7  1,166.4  862.4  1,038.7  987.4  737.8 
Pricing Terms:  k  E  s  % of market-adjusted buys  !% 
relative to all buys  50.1  73.3  28.0  58.0  54.3  71.4  66.2  59.9  44.9  9 
b 
% of market-adjusted sells  09  $. 
relative to all sells  45.3  12.5  19.7  46.2  58.8  57.1  46.1  36.7  45.3  r: 
2  r: 
Note: Table data are based on trade records of  154  traders who traded at  ECI during 2001.  d 
.c 
R 
""Producer"  refers to firms specializing  in production, "user" refers to firms specializing  in processing or breaking eggs, "broker"  refers to firms specializing  in brokerage, and "prod-user" 
refers to firms that own layers and processing or breaking facilities but do not engage in brokerage.  & 
% 
'Number  of layers is based on the average of  self-reported numbers of layers from 1999,2000,  and 2001  Egg Industry (Watt Publishing Co.) surveys.  8  o 
'Five ECI members not included in the operational types are integrated firms with some brokerage activities. Only 111 members owned layers.  r: 
3 
dQuantity  is measured in cases, where one case = 30  dozen eggs.  m 
P 
O 
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A case of price manipulation occurs if a firm that needs additional inventory decides 
to initially sell some of its inventory to lower the price, or vice versa. On 151  out of 255 
trading days in 2001, at least one firm bought and sold on the same day. Overall, 28 
firms bought and sold on the same day, each averaging 8.3 days. A random examination 
of transactions made by two firms that most frequently bought and sold on the same day 
shows that their purchases and sales consisted of  distinct loads differing by product 
type, weightlsize, andlor color. Thus, this particular case of  price manipulation is most 
likely not occurring at ECI.1° 
Regarding the usage of pricing terms, reported in the last two rows of table 1, 
patterns were distinct across operational types but  not across flock size." Producers and 
prod-users used the two terms relatively equally. Users chose market-adjusted terms 
for a large share of their purchases (73.3%),  but for only a small share of sells (12.5%). 
Brokers traded in spot terms most of the time. 
Model Development 
In an industry where the majority of transactions are contracted and the contract price 
is based on a third-party quote, market transactions likely address an inventory man- 
agement problem. As noted earlier, prices of eggs under contracts change on a weekly 
basis, but quantity orders arrive daily. Let Q,  denote the inventory of the ith firm at 
time t.  The inventory represents eggs available for a producer to meet delivery orders 
and for a user to utilize in processing. The quantity the firm needs at  time t is Q,,  which 
represents the quantity of eggs received in orders for aproducer, and for a user, a target 
quantity that maximizes the efficiency of the processing procedure or to meet storefront 
demand. The inventory needs to be adjusted if Q,  does not match Q,.  For producers, 
both production and daily orders are variable. In  particular, a disruption in production 
is inevitable when a portion of  layers needs to be culled and replaced. Users, on the 
other hand, can request target quantities on a daily basis from contracted suppliers, but 
suppliers may not be able to meet changes in demand. Also, many users maintain their 
own inventory, requiring adjustments beyond daily contacts with contracted suppliers. 
Assuming price manipulation does not occur, the firm will buy the difference qb,  = 
Qit - Qit  > 0, and will sell the difference qs,  = Qit - Q,  > 0. The objective of the firms in 
the short run is to minimize the cost of inventory adjustment, C(qit),  where the quantity 
of adjustment is q,  = qb,  + qs,.  Circumstances in which the need to buy or sell arises 
will vary at  any given point in time. Aggregated over time, quantities traded by a firm 
are expected to depend on its operational characteristics and inventory adjustment 
costs. 
There are several venues for a firm to adjust inventory with various costs. Spot and 
market-adjusted trading on ECI represent two such venues, while adjustments can also 
be made through individual contacts with suppliers, clients, or brokers. Let Bi denote 
the set of  available venues to firm i to adjust inventory and Cw(q),  o~  Bi, the cost of 
adjustment in venue o.  The firm chooses venue o  when Cw(q)  < Cc(q)  for all  C * o.  Since 
la A more serious case of price manipulation is if the ECI trades were used to impact the contract price. Because firms  do 
not know how ECI prices are incorporated into UB quotes, such cases seem improbable, and in any event cannot be examined 
due to data unavailability. 
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data on alternative venues are not available, the choice set SZi in the current analysis 
will be limited to the two pricing terms at ECI, focusing on the relative costs of  the 
venues available at ECI, rather than how the trading costs at  ECI compare to other 
venues. Recent tradingvolume at  ECI, however, suggests it  has become a low-cost, if not 
the lowest-cost, alternative for an increasing number of firms. 
The choice of pricing terms depends on factors that determine the inventory adjust- 
ment cost C,(qit). First, inventory schedules vary by differences in the equipment and 
management choices available to firms and  their scale of operation. Second, contractual 
agreements and existing packaging and processing facilities result in varying costs of 
inventory adjustment by egg type. For example, the cheapest alternative for producers 
who have contracted for deliveries of cartoned eggs is to make adjustments with CTN 
eggs. Yet, to have CTN eggs packaged in custom cartons, time must be allowed for 
packaging materials to be shipped to the egg supplier. If particular packaging material 
is specified in contracts and time is limited, these producers may prefer to purchase GL 
or GNR eggs and package them at their own facility. 
The storability of eggs implies that price expectations may affect inventory adjust- 
ment decisions. As noted above, the price under contract becomes known on Thursday 
for Sunday through Saturday deliveries. Thus, every firm knows the difference between 
the spot and next week's price from Thursday through Saturday. Prior to Thursday, 
firms can follow the changes in the UB quotes to adjust expectations for the following 
week's contract price. Also, seasonality likely matters, as the largest volume of eggs is 
consumed during holiday seasons. Inventory adjustments may be less active during  the 
tight market conditions surrounding holidays because there is little excess inventory 
available. 
Empirical Specification 
Two relationships are  investigated empirically: (a)  the  relationship between quantities 
traded by firms and their characteristics using trader-level data aggregated to monthly 
observations, and (b)  the relationship between the chosen pricing terms and their 
determinants  using transaction-level  observations. All variables used in the analysis are 
identified in table 2. 
Quantities Traded 
On average, ECI members in 2001 traded on 38 days. Because not all firms traded 
positive quantities every month, the quantity traded by firm i in month t (9,)  can be 
specified as a censored regression model: 
where x is a vector of firm characteristics, inventory adjustment costs, and seasonal 
factors; p is a coefficient vector; E is an error term; and q,; is the unobservable need 
for inventory adjustment. The error term may be related to some or all operation 
characteristics and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2  2  uEi  = o,eZIY,  where a, is a constant, z is a vector of  operation characteristics, y is a coeffi- 
cient vector, and the null of homoskedasticity is y = 0. Peterson  Trading Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  457 
Table 2. Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis 























Equals 1  if the firm owns between 1  and 2 million layers; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm owns between 2 and 5 million layers; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm owns between 5 and 10 million layers; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the load is cartoned eggs; 0 otherwise 
Number of business days between the trade and delivery dates (scaled so that 1  = 10 days) 
One-day-ahead forecast of UB quote (loeldozen)  if the buyer is PONLY, 0 otherwise 
One-day-ahead forecast of UB quote (loeldozen) if the buyer is UONLY,  0 otherwise 
One-day-ahead forecast of UB  quote (loeldozen)  if the seller is PONLY; 0 otherwise 
One-day-ahead forecast of UB quote (loeldozen) if the seller is UONLY,  0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the load is graded loose eggs; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the load is graded nest run eggs; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm owns more than 10 million layers; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if January or February; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if July or August; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if March or April; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if May or June; 0 otherwise 
Average degree of diversity of egg types traded over the previous 12  months 
Equals 1  if the firm is headquartered in [equation (I)], the load is destined to, or the load 
originated in [equation (3)] IA, IL, IN, MI, MN, ND, NE, OH, SD, or WI, 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm is headquartered in [equation (111, the load is destined to, or the load 
originated in [equation (3)l CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, or VT;  0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the load is nest run breaking stocks; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm is headquartered in [equation (111, the load is destined to, or the load 
originated in [equation (3)l ID, MT, OR, WA, or WY, 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the transaction is priced in market-adjusted terms; 0 if it is priced in  spot terms 
Proportion of trades involving cartoned eggs in the previous month, if the firm traded a 
positive quantity; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of trades involving graded loose eggs in the previous month, if the firm traded a 
positive quantity; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of trades involving graded nest run eggs in the previous month, if the firm 
traded a positive quantity; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of trades involving nest mn breaking stocks in the previous month, if the firm 
traded a positive quantity; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm owns both layers and a user facility, and is not involved in any 
brokerage activities; 0 otherwise 
Equals 1  if the firm owns layers and no user facility, and is not involved in any brokerage 
activities; 0 otherwise 
Quantity of eggs traded (measured in units of 10,000 30-dozen cases) 
Quantity of eggs traded in a given transaction (measured in units of 10,000 30-dozen cases) 
QTY  squared 
Equals 1  if the firm is headquartered in [equation (I)],  the load is destined to, or the load 
originated in [equation (3)] AR, CO, KS, LA, MO, NM, OK, or TX, 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Continued 
Variable  Definition 
SE  Equals 1 if the firm is  headquartered in [equation (I)],  the load is destined to, or the load 
originated in [equation (3)l AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN,  VA, or WV, 0 otherwise 
SEPOCT  Equals 1  if September or October; 0 otherwise 
TQ12M  Quantities of eggs traded by a given firm during the previous 12 months (measured in 
units of  10,000 30-dozen cases) 
UONLY  Equals 1  if the firm owns a user facility and no layers, and is not involved in any brokerage 
activities; 0 otherwise 
USPROD  U.S. egg production (billions) 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables in tobit regression models can be computed 
as follows. Let y,  be a variable that appears in qt  and zi,  or both. If y is continuous, its 
marginal effect can be computed as: 
where E[.l is the expectation operator, @(.) and  @(a)  are the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and probability density function, respectively, and py and yy are 
coefficients associated with y (Greene, 2002b, E21-44,45). If the explanatory variable is 
binary, the marginal effect is computed as E [qit  I q,,  zi ,  yit = 11 -  E [qit  I xi,, zi ,  yit = 01 . 
12 
The sample consists of monthly trades by  154 firms who traded at  ECI during 2001. 
The firm characteristics  considered include the operational type, flock size, and location. 
Four operational types (producer,  user, user that owns layers, and other operations that 
are involved in brokerage activities) were represented by  binary variables (PONLY, 
UONLY, and PNU), with the miscellaneous types in brokerage as the base. Production 
scale was included as a set of binary variables based on the averages of the self-reported 
number of layers in Egg Industry's 1999,2000, and 2001 surveys, classified into groups 
of  less than 1  million, 1-2  million, 2-5  million, 5-10  million, and more than 10 million 
layers (BTWIN2, BTW2N5, BTW5N10, and GTIO); the group with less than 1  million 
layers was the  base. Binary location variables were defined according to the state  where 
each firm was headquartered (NE, MW, NW, SE, and SC),  with the Southwest and 
Canada combined as the base. 
To test whether ECI is a preferred marketplace for certain egg types, lagged 
proportions of egg types traded and the degree of egg type diversification were included 
as regressors, using monthly observations from 2000 when needed. Egg trades were 
categorized into seven product types described above, aggregated over color and weight/ 
size classes. The proportions of trades involving each egg type relative to the total 
number of trades made by each firm in the previous month were specified as regressors 
(PCTN-, ,  PGL-, ,  PGNR-, ,  and PNRBS-, ), excluding the combined proportion of CHEX, 
12 If a group of binary variables represent a category of characteristics, the marginal effects are  computed as  the difference 
between E[q, I x,, z,], where the variable is equal to 1  and  the other binary variables within the category are equal to zero, 
and  Elq,, I  x,, z,], where all binary variables within the category are equal to zero. Peterson  Trading Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  459 
LIQ, and FRZN as the base. For firms that did not trade in a given month, the propor- 
tions were set at zero. As a measure of  egg type diversity, a normalized entropy was 
computed from the proportions and averaged over the previous 12  months (MIXI~M).~~ 
In addition, the total quantities each firm traded in the previous 12 months (TQ12M) 
was included to control for the size effect of the firm's ECI activity. Monthly numbers 
of eggs produced in the United States (USDAlAgricultural Statistics Board, 2004) were 
included (USPROD) to examine whether participation in a marginal marketplace is 
related to the total quantity of commodity. Seasonality was captured by bimonthly 
dummy variables. 
Choice of  Pricing Terms 
The choice of pricing terms is specified as a function of the factors impacting inventory 
adjustment costs in alternative venues, which is denoted by a vector u. The nth trade 
can be quoted in market-adjusted terms (p, = 1) or spot terms (p, = 0). Assuming a 
logistic probability distribution,  the  relationship between the  pricing term and its deter- 
minants can be written: 
where A is a vector of coefficients  and u  is an  error term with a mean-zero logistic distri- 
bution. The variance of the error term may be related to operational characteristics of 
the buyer and the seller involved in the nth trade vn  such that atn  = (evAK)2~2/3,  where 
K is a vector of coefficients and K = 0 is the null of homoskedastic errors (Greene, 2002a, 
E15-47). 
The marginal effect is computed for a continuous explanatory variable m as: 
where a, =u~Ae-";~,  and Am and K,  are the coefficients on m (Greene, 2002a, E15-53). 
If m appears nonlinearly in equation (3),  the last term in  parentheses is replaced by the 
first derivative of (3)  with respect to m. If the explanatory variable is a dummy variable 
(see footnote 12 for a description of  the case of a group of dummy variables), the mar- 
ginal effect is computed as the difference E [p,  l u,, v,,  m,  = l]  -  E [p,  l u,, v,,  m,  = 01. 
The sample includes 8,522 trades consummated in 2001. Operational type and flock 
size, defined analogous to the quantities traded model, of both the buyer and the seller 
in each transaction were included as explanatory variables. Because eggs under typical 
contracts are  market-adjusted, all firms  likely prefer market-adjusted terms, regardless 
of whether they are buying or selling. An  exception may be brokers who likely do not 
partake in contracts. Also, producers may find spot prices more convenient to compare 
with production costs. 
l3 The ith firm's egg type diversity in month t was computed as 
12  7 
MIX12Mjt = x  x  ~ft.,log(l/~,~t.,)/10g(7))/12, 
8=1  l=l 
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A consummated trade reflects a negotiated  outcome through a trade coordinator 
between the buyer and the seller. Large-scale retailers who warehouse their eggs, such 
as  Wal-Mart and other supermarket chains, typically demand 20 to 25 days of shelf life 
from their suppliers (Miller, 2003). Thus, most commercially  produced eggs reach super- 
markets within a few days of laying, leaving producers with less flexibility in terms of 
timing of inventory adjustment than users. Under the  assumption that market-adjusted 
terms are  usually preferred, these facts suggest producers must accept spot terms more 
frequently than other operational types. 
Regardless of  the operational types involved in a transaction, another issue is 
whether the pricing terms are more often resolved in favor of the buyer's or the seller's 
preferences. A firm buying to fill its shortfalls may be willing to yield in order to secure 
the commodity;  in contrast, a firm selling excess inventory may be happy to find a buyer 
for it. Thus, whether buyers obtain more favorable terms than sellers is an empirical 
question. 
In  addition to firms' characteristics, other terms of trade  were included as  regressors: 
location of eggs, egg type, transaction volume, time to delivery, and price expectations. 
Destination and origin of  eggs, classified by ECI regions, were specified to capture 
regional effects, with the Southwest and Canada as the base. The Northwest was also 
included in the base group for place of origin due to the limited number of trades from 
this region. Egg types were represented by binary variables (CTN, GL, GNR, and 
NRBS), with CHEX, LIQ, and FRZN as the base. The quantity of eggs in each trans- 
action (QTY) and its squared term (QTY2) were included to capture any volume effect 
on the pricing terms.14  The number of business days between the date of the trade and 
the date of delivery (DELLAG)  was specified to account for the timing effect of delivery. 
It is expected that the longer into the future the delivery is made, the more likely eggs 
are priced on a market-adjusted basis to be compatible with eggs under contracts. 
For price expectations, the relevant price is the UB quote on which most regular 
contracts are  based. A time-series model was estimated using daily UB quotes in 2001 
for a common type of egg+artoned,  large, white eggs bought in the Northeast region. 
During the sample period, the selected UB quotes remained unchanged for several 
weeks at  a time, and hence, heteroskedasticity was suspected. Based on the Akaike 
information and Schwartz Bayesian criteria,  the  UB quote series (g)  was modeled as  the 
following GARCH(1,l): 
4,  = fi  e,,  e, - Normal(0, I), 
l4 In the conceptual model, transaction  volume equals inventory adjustment needs, which arise due to factors beyond the 
firm's control. As a reviewer points out, however,  transaction volume may be endogenous. Testingfor its endogeneity would 
require firm-level observations  on the factors  determining  inventory adjustment  needs, including  the volume under contract 
and the inventory  level at the time of transaction,  which are not available. Lacking sufficient  data to indicate otherwise, QTY 
and QTY2 are assumed to be exogenous variables. Peterson  Trading Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  461 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Quantities Traded Model 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 


























Notes: Number of observations = 1,848.  Variables are defined in table 2. 
"This  variable equaled zero for 650  observations. The positive observations of q had a mean of 1.452  and a standard 
deviation of 3.078. 
where numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and the initial lagged observations 
were obtained from 2000. Using these estimates, one-day-ahead forecasts of the UB 
quote were computed for each trading day. 
A firm is expected to respond differently to price expectations when the intended 
transaction is a purchase or a sale. Expecting a higher UB quote, sellers would prefer 
to trade on market-adjusted terms, because the following week's price is likely to 
increase. On the other hand, buyers would prefer spot pricing, all else equal. Preferences 
would reverse if the UB quotes were expected to decrease. Yet, as noted earlier, produ- 
cers and users are expected to have differing degrees of flexibility in their purchases or 
sales. To account for these differences in preferences and flexibility, the UB quote 
forecasts were multiplied by binary variables that indicated whether the buyer of  the 
transaction was a producer or a user, and whether the seller was a producer or a user 
(EUBBP, EUBBU, EUBSP, and EUBSU). 
Last, similar to the quantities traded model, U.S. egg production during the month 
the trade was consummated (USPROD) was included to reflect general market condi- 
tions, and bimonthly dummy variables were included to account for seasonality. 
Results 
Equations (1)  and (3) were estimated using LIMDEP version 8.0 (Greene, 2002a,b). 
Marginal effects were evaluated at the sample means, and their approximate standard 
errors were computed using the software's WALD command (Greene, 2002c, R11-11). 
Quantities Traded 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in equation (1)  are presented in table 3, and 
the results are reported in table 4. The null of homoskedastic errors was rejected with 
ap-value of less than 0.001. The marginal effects of firm characteristics collectively 462  December ZOO5  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects for Monthly Quantities 
Traded (dependent variable = q) 
Primary Index Function  Variance Term 
Standard  Marginal  Standard 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  Error  Effects "  Coefficient  Error 
Constant  -  1.429**  0.632 
PONLY  0.202**  0.101  -0.214**  -0.970**  0.043 
UONLY  -0.003  0.133  -0.203**  -0.370**  0.063 
PNU  -0.503**  0.172  -0.234**  0.070  0.063 
GTlO  -0.299  0.894  0.135  0.620**  0.084 
BTW5NIO  0.251  0.166  0.166  -0.094  0.086 
BTW2N5  -0.082  0.062  0.078*  0.318**  0.056 
BTWIN2  0.046  0.045  -0.073**  -0.449**  0.063 
NE  0.114**  0.050  -0.005  -0.422**  0.043 
SE  0.125**  0.061  0.000  -0.453**  0.077 
MW  0.005  0.087  0.317**  0.646**  0.039 
SC  -0.093  0.079  0.015  0.211**  0.072 
NW  -0.372  0.279  -0.070  0.378**  0.127 
MIXl2M  0.471*  0.259  0.926**  1.722**  0.136 
PCTN-,  0.492**  0.198  0.597**  0.717**  0.081 
PGL-1  0.392**  0.045  0.182**  -0.286**  0.043 
PGNR-,  0.387**  0.057  0.152**  -0.362**  0.059 
PNRBS-,  '  0.310**  0.153  0.244**  0.065  0.045 
TQ12M  0.087**  0.003  0.062** 
USPROD  0.081  0.085  0.058 
JANFEB  0.295**  0.068  0.211** 
MARAE'R  0.224**  0.061  0.157** 
MAYJUN  0.179**  0.060  0.124** 
JULA  UG  0.084  0.066  0.057 
SEPOCT  0.105*  0.063  0.071* 
Disturbance Std. Dev.  1.517**  0.059 
No. of Obsenrations  1,848 
Lagrange Multiplier Test  655.69 
(p-Value)  (0.00) 
Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at  the 10%  and 5%  levels, respectively.  Variables are 
defined in table 2. 
"Marginal effects for continuous  variables are computed as  equation(3)  evaluated at  sample means ofvariables. For binary 
variables, marginal effects are computed as  the difference between the expected value of the dependent variable when the 
binary variable equals one and all other binary variables in the same category equal zero, and the expected value of the 
dependent variable when all binary variables in the same category equal zero. 
The null hypothesis is the presence of homoskedasticity. 
suggest that  ECI must have provided balanced access to all industry participants across 
operational types, flock sizes, and regions. The marginal effects for the operational type 
variables (PONLY, UONLY, and PNU) were statistically significant and negative, 
consistent  with the  expectation that firms with brokerage activities trade more actively, 
and were statistically equivalent to each other based on painvise likelihood ratio tests. 
The marginal effects of the flock size variables were mostly statistically insignificant, 
and those that were significant were small in magnitude (about 700 cases). Peterson  Trading  Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  463 
The only location variable with a statistically significant marginal effect was the Mid- 
west (MW).  The result implies an average firm in the Midwest trades 3,170 cases more 
than firms in  other regions. The magnitude seems reasonable given the  overall monthly 
average trading of 9,416 cases and a high industry concentration in the Midwest. 
An increase in the diversity of egg type mix increased the quantities traded, ceteris 
paribus, suggesting for firms that handle a variety of eggs, ECI serves as a "one-stop" 
source for their inventory adjustment needs. ECI also appears to be a preferred inven- 
tory adjustment venue for CTN, GL, GNR, and NRBS eggs relative to other egg types 
and products. Moreover, firms that use ECI must be repeaters; an average firm traded 
620 cases more in the current month for every additional 10,000 cases it traded in the 
previous 12 months, holding all else equal. 
The level of ECI trading was not related to U.S. egg production (USPROD). This 
finding would be of concern if ECI's role of price discovery were essential. Yet, as an 
inventory adjustment means, trading volume at a marginal marketplace need not 
coincide with the national market. It  is likely that local market conditions, if observable, 
would have had more impact. Finally, seasonal impacts were mostly statistically signifi- 
cant. In  2001, trading  was more active in the  first half of the year than in  the latter half, 
holding all else constant. 
Choice of Pricing Terms 
The descriptive statistics and regression results for equation (3) are presented, respec- 
tively, in tables 5 and 6. Since four of the regressors with expected UB quotes (EUBBP, 
EUBBU, EUBSP, and EUBSU) are predicted values based on equation (5), standard 
error estimates of coefficient estimates reported in table 6 are likely underestimated 
(Pagan, 1984). However, the number of observations was ample, and diagnostic tests 
suggest the generated regressor problem was minimal.15 The null hypothesis of homo- 
skedastic errors was rejected with ap-value of less than 0.001. 
No single operational type except for prod-users seemed to systematically obtain one 
pricing term more often than the other. The marginal effect of PONLY as a seller was 
-0.306, favoring spot terms, reflecting producers' limited flexibility compared to other 
operational types. Eggs bought or sold by prod-users were more likely to be priced in 
market-adjusted terms, all else equal, consistent with the flexibility of integrated firms. 
Several marginal effects with statistical significance suggest that eggs bought (sold) by 
a user or a firm with many layers were more likely priced in market-adjusted (spot) 
terms, all else equal. This finding implies pricing terms were generally resolved in  favor 
of the buyers' preferences. The results for firms with 1-2  million layers were different, 
which could partly be explained by the  fact that 7 out of 14  producers with this flock size 
were integrated with processing or brokerage activities. 
Pricing terms also depended on other terms of trade. Eggs originating from the  North- 
east, Southeast, Midwest, and South Central regions were more likely to be priced in 
market-adjusted terms, while GL, GNR, and NRBS eggs were more likely traded in spot 
terms than other eggs, all else equal. The pricing terms were nonlinearly related to 
transaction size (QTY).  At the sample mean of 1,021  cases, an additional 1,000 cases 
16 The x2 statistic for testing the joint significance  of the coefficients was highly significant. Moreover, McFadden's likeli- 
hood ratio index was 0.418, and the model predicted pricing terms with an average accuracy of 80.4%. 464  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
decreased the probability of the transaction quoted in market-adjusted terms by 0.095. 
Thus, larger trades were more likely priced in spot terms. Also, at  the sample mean of 
a 6.3-day lag, an additional delay of  one day increased the probability of  market- 
adjusted pricing by 0.017, consistent with expectations. 
Loads involving producers were more likely to be priced with market-adjusted terms 
when higher UB quotes were expected. In particular, the probability that eggs sold by 
producers were market-adjusted increased by 0.187 when the UB quote was expected 
to increase by 10 cents per dozen, holding all else constant. While the marginal effect 
on PONLY implies producers were at  a negotiating disadvantage on average, this result 
suggests that producers were more likely to obtain preferred pricing terms for their 
sales. Eggs bought by users were more likely priced in spot terms when the UB quotes 
were expected to increase, all else equal, consistent with the expected buyers' prefer- 
ences. Thus, users in a buying position were likely to obtain their preferred terms. 
Regarding general market conditions, pricing terms were not statistically impacted 
by U.S. egg production in a given month. Also, the likelihood of  transactions consum- 
mated in market-adjusted terms was slightly but statistically significantly higher in 
bi-months when the quantities traded were higher, ceteris paribus. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
P  0.580  0.494 
Buyers: 
PONLY  0.257  0.437 
UONLY  0.140  0.347 
PNU  0.245  0.430 
GTlO  0.058  0.233 
BTW5NlO  0.103  0.304 
BTW2N5  0.143  0.350 
BTWlN2  0.023  0.150 
NE  0.229  0.420 
SE  0.082  0.274 
Mw  0.242  0.428 
SC  0.109  0.311 
NW  0.017  0.131 
Sellers: 
PONLY  0.502  0.500 
UONLY  0.018  0.134 
PNU  0.307  0.461 
GTlO  0.073  0.260 
BTW5NlO  0.164  0.370 
BTW2N5  0.132  0.339 
BTWlN2  0.031  0.173 
NE  0.185  0.388 
SE  0.049  0.216 
Mw  0.658  0.475 
SC  0.083  0.275 
Note: Variables are defined in  table 2. 
Variables in the Pricing Terms Model 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
CTN  0.182  0.386 
GL  0.409  0.492 
GNR  0.179  0.383 
NRBS  0.179  0.383 
&Ty  0.102  0.260 
QTy2  0.078  1.255 
DELLAG  0.630  0.453 
E UBBP  1.856  3.195 
EUBBU  0.979  2.452 
E UBSP  3.523  3.553 
E UBSU  0.130  0.961 
USPROD  7.178  0.236 
JANFEB  0.193  0.395 
MARAPR  0.186  0.389 
MAYJUN  0.154  0.361 
JULAUG  0.162  0.368 
SEPOCT  0.148  0.355 Peterson  Trading Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  465 
Table 6. Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects for Pricing Terms 
(dependent variable = p) 
Standard  Marginal  Standard  Marginal 
Explanatory Variable  Coeficient  Error  Effects "  Coefficient  Error  Effects " 











































-2.549**  1.198 
<-  Buyers -> 
-0.843*  0.463  -0.050 
8.662**  1.720  0.312** 
-0.265  0.167  0.120* 
1.019**  0.196  0.120** 
13.211*  7.089  -0.039 
0.395**  0.100  0.090** 
1.602**  0.510  -0.114** 
<-  Destination -> 
2.651**  0.285  0.094 
2.119**  0.253  0.109 
0.833**  0.162  -0.059 
1.233**  0.160  0.143** 
1.903**  0.408  -0.065 
0.974  0.711  0.008 
-4.691**  0.741  -0.258** 
-4.371**  0.732  -0.218** 
-6.727**  0.852  -0.579** 
.10.713**  1.322  -0.949** 
2.002**  0.266 
1.862**  0.191  0.172** 
0.141**  0.061  0.037** 
-0.714**  0.221  -0.108** 
0.479**  0.095  0.187** 









<-  Sellers -> 
-3.496**  0.674  -0.306** 
-2.188  2.588  -0.231 
0.073  0.149  0.111** 
0.017  0.187  -0.169** 
0.246  0.151  -0.137** 
-0.772**  0.133  -0.122** 
-0.084  0.122  0.014 
<-  Origin -> 
2.370**  0.444  0.329** 
3.474**  0.459  0.478** 
3.492**  0.421  0.502** 
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Table 6. Continued 
Standard  Marginal  Standard  Marginal 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  Error  Effects "  Coefficient  Error  Effectsa 
Trader Chars.  (cont'd):  <-  Buyers  ------>  <-  Sellers -> 
- 
Log Likelihood  =  -3,375.56 
x2 Statistic  =  4,844.27 
(p-Value)  (0.00) 
Lagrange Multiplier Testc =  169.44 
(p-Value)  (0.00) 
Notes: Single and double asterisks (*)denote statistical significance at  the 10%  and 5% levels, respectively.  Variables are 
defined in table 2. 
"Marginal effects for continuous variables are computed as the derivative of the logistic cumulative distribution function 
with respect to the explanatory variables evaluated at their sample means. For binary variables, marginal effects are 
computed as the difference between the probability of p = 1  when the binary variable equals one and all other binary 
variables in the same category are equal to zero, and the probability ofp = 1  when all binary variables in the same category 
are equal to zero. 
bThe  null hypothesis is that all coefficients (not including the constant) are jointly zero. 
'The null hypothesis is the presence of homoskedasticity. 
Implications 
The focus of the thin market literature has been on the declining function of  its price 
discovery role. This paper sheds light on an alternative role for a marginalized market- 
place-providing  a means of inventory adjustment-by  examining unpublished trans- 
action data from Egg Clearinghouse, Inc. An open inventory adjustment process allows 
firms to post their excess inventory for sale and to find offers that would fill their 
shortfalls. Such a process reduces the cost of  finding potential trading partners when 
inventory-adjustment needs arise. 
Firms participating in a marginal market for inventory adjustment would buy and 
sell regardless of  their operational types. Given the increase in obligations  under 
contracts, it is reasonable that producers of the good may need to purchase more of the 
same good to meet client orders, while processors of the good may have excess input, 
which can be sold. Indeed, ECI transaction data document that these seemingly con- 
verse transactions are common. 
It is  well understood that successful marketplaces usually attract participation from 
all groups of firms in an  industry through offering trading terms which do not favor one 
group over another. The presented analysis of participation in the ECI, as  measured by 
quantities  traded by individual firms, revealed that this attribute is one reason for ECI's 
success. Participation was balanced across all operational types, sizes, and regions, and 
ECI participants often became repeat users. Participation was not related to overall 
market conditions, but this is not essential for a market whose primary purpose is 
inventory adjustment. In addition, the  results showed that a diverse offering of tradable 
commodity specifications is helpful, since it lowers the inventory adjustment costs for 
firms with a diverse product mix. Peterson  Trading Behavior in a Marginal Organized Market  467 
A marketplace inherently discovers price for the transactions, and thus, even if the 
price discovery role is not primary, it is important to ensure that the price discovered, 
no matter how infrequent, can serve as  a check for the price used in non-market trans- 
actions. Of  the two pricing terms available at ECI, spot terms contribute to price 
discovery while market-adjusted terms do not. Based on results from the analysis of the 
pricing term choices, the use of pricing terms in the sample was balanced across differ- 
ent groups of firms. However, the industry needs to be aware that for ECI to maintain 
its function as  a check for UB quotes, it must maintain active and balanced use of spot 
terms across all firms. 
Several options are available for agricultural sectors concerned with reliability of 
market prices. The cheese market is one model with a centralized thin marketplace 
discovering prices used to price the off-market transactions. Despite its  long history, the 
cheese exchange continues to be plagued with efficiency problems, recently prompting 
a probe by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Martin, 2005). The livestock 
market has  been exploringvarious directions. Some private entities  are  providing cattle 
inventory adjustment services for small-scale feeders, similar to ECI. Because spot 
prices are  not being reliably discovered in all locations, aggregated prices across several 
major markets are  newly designated as  a base price for formulas and contracts. The egg 
industry has been successful with ECI. But it is important to recognize that one key 
ingredient to its success is the existence of  industry-approved non-market-based UB 
quotes, which are used to price the vast majority of  eggs. Unless an alternative price- 
setting method can be agreed upon, a marketplace, no matter how marginalized, may 
continue to be burdened with the role of price discovery. 
[Received September 2002;Jinal revision received August 2005.1 
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